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ABSTRACT : This research investigates the effects of managerial ownership, 
intitutional ownership and independent board of commissioners on earnings 
management either simultanleously or partially. Population of this research are 
companies listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange that registered in LQ45 index 
from 2014-2018. The type of this research is descriptive study and using secondary 
data from the financial reports. This reseach uses multiple linier regression 
technique, using firm size as a control variable. where the results of this research 
show that simultaneously managerial ownership, institutional ownership, 
independent board of commissioners, and firm size have significant effect to 
earnings management. Partially, intitutional ownership have no significant effect to 
earnings management, managerial ownership have no significant effect to 
earnings management and  independent board of commissioners have no 
significant effect to earnings management. 
 
Keywords: “institutional ownership, managerial ownership,independent board of 
commissioners, firm size, earnings management”. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The income statement of a company will depict the real condition of the 
company's finances in the current year. In the income statement should be listed 
facts that occur in the field, Karna will help the internal and external parties in 
making decisions. External parties that are investors will be greatly assisted by the 
information that is clear and factual generated in profit reports, while the internal 
party that is the management of the company will easily utilize the information 
contained in the income statement as an accountability to external parties i.e. 
investors and readers of financial statements.  
  Investors will always see the information contained in the income 
statement, one of which is profit, income information is often the target of 
engineering through the action of the management opportunistic to maximize its 
satisfaction. These opportunistic actions are done by selecting a specific 
accounting policy, so that profit can be set, raised or lowered accordingly. 
Management behaviour to measure profit in accordance with the wishes is known 
as profit management.  
  Profit management is an effort from the management of the company to 
audit or influence the information in the financial statements in order to manipulate 
the stakeholders who want to know the performance and condition of the company 
(Sulistyanto, 2014). This action is very detrimental to many of the parties in a 
relatively long period of time can interfere and harm the company. The action of 
profit management or efforts to influence this financial statement is very contrary 
to the purpose of the financial statement itself where the understanding of financial 
statements by Financial Accounting Standards (SAK) is "as a media provider of 
information concerning financial position, performance, and change of financial 
position of a company that is beneficial to a number of users of financial statements 
in the decision of economic decisions.      
                             
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. Agency Theory 
 Agency theory is a conflict that occurs when the separation between the 
company or the shareholder as the principal with the manager of the company or 
the manager as an agent. Conflicts that occur is the difference in interest between 
the two parties, and according to the view (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) The principal 
and the agent seeks to maximize prosperity respectively.   
 
2. Corporate Governance Theory 
 Corvorate Governance is a method and procedural which is used by BOC 
and executive to make strategic direction, expectation of achievement of company 
objectives, monitoring and evaluation of risk management and ensuring the use of 
resources responsibly, (IFAC 2012). (Sutojo & Siswanto, 2013) explained that 
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Corporate Governance is the means or mechanism used to convince the capital to 
obtain a return in accordance with the invested investment. 
 
3. Institutional Ownership Theory 
 Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the institution. 
Institutional ownership is a tool that can be used to reduce conflicts of interest 
(Pasaribu, 2016), while according to (May Yuniati, 2016) institutional ownership is 
the level of shareholding by the institution within the company, measured by the 
institutional-owned stock propotions at the end of the year expressed in 
percentages.  
 Institutional ownership is a condition where institutions have shares in a 
company. These institutions can be government institutions, private institutions, 
domestic and foreign (Widarjo, 2010). According to (Widiastuti, 2013) Institutional 
ownership is a shareholding by the agency from external. The institutional 
ownership structure is the percentage of shares owned by the institutional 
authorities of the total shares of the company in circulation. Institutional parties 
include insurance companies, banks, investment firms and ownership by other 
institutions. In institutional ownership does not expose institutional value to the 
company's parent.  
 
4. Managerial Theory of Ownership 
 Managerial ownership is the percentage of votes related to the shares and 
options owned by the board of directors and managers of the company. (Boediono, 
2005). The proportion of shareholding by the company's management will 
influence the manager's behaviour in the management of the company's financial 
statements, if the manager participates in shares ownership then the manager will 
act like a shareholder who will make the level of financial statements become 
qualified (Mahariana, 2014). According to Jensen and Meckling (Hikmah, 2013) 
that the profit management emerged because of an agency conflict that is a 
difference of interest between the owner (principal) and the management of the 
company (agent).   
 
5. Independent Board of Commissioners 
 The independent Board of Commissioners is a person appointed to 
represent independent shareholders (minority shareholders) and designated 
parties not in the capacity of representing any party and solely appointed based on 
the background of the knowledge, experience, and the professional connection he 
has to fully perform the task in the interest of the company (Agoes, 2014). Based 
on the regulation of the Financial Services Authority No. 55/POJK. 04/2015, 
independent Commissioner is a board of Commissioners originating from outside 
the public company and has fulfilled the requirements stipulated in the regulation 
of the Financial Services Authority No. 33/POJK. 04/2014. 
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6. Profit Management theory 
 Profit management is an ability to  "manipulate " options available and take 
the right choice to be able to reach the expected profit level (Stice, 2014). 
According to (Weston, 2014), "profit management is an intervention in the process 
of external financial reporting with the intention of obtaining personal gains. From 
the above, profit management can be concluded management action in the internal 
financial reporting process for the purpose of the personal benefit of the manager 
or company by raising, leveling up, or lowering the reported profit from the unit to 
which it is responsible. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Institutional ownership is a stock of companies owned by institutions or 
institutions (insurance companies, banks, investment firms, and other institution 
ownership), the existence of institutional ownership is allegedly able to provide 
surveillance mechanisms aimed at aligning various interests in the company 
(Maharani, 2014). High institutional ownership can minimize profit management 
practices based on the above explanation, the first hypothesis in this study is: 
 
H1 :  Institutional ownership has a negative and significant influence  
  on profit management 
 
 With managerial ownership will make the management position equal to the 
owner of the company that can align or unite the interests of management with 
shareholders so that the management will act just like the investor in general and 
will not do profit management in order to know the state of the company that about 
with the existence of managerial ownership in the company will reduce the 
management action. Research has stated that managerial ownership has a 
significant negative influence on profit management.  Based on the explanation 
above, the second hypothesis in this study was: 
 
H2:  Managerial ownership has a negative and significant influence on  
  profit management 
 
 Profit management can be minimized with better surveillance mechanisms. 
The independent Board of Commissioners is believed to provide improvement to 
corporate supervision. With the inclusion of the Board of Commissioners from 
external companies will increase the effectiveness of the Board in supervising 
management to prevent misserving financial statements or fraudulent in presenting 
financial statements. 
 
H3:  The independent Board of Commissioners has a significant  
  and negative influence on profit management 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
 The research was designed using hypothesis test research, conducted by 
combining cross sectional and time series studies. The population in this research 
is the company which is included in the LQ45 index listed on the Indonesia Stock 
exchange for the year 2014-2018. The sample selection technique is done by 
purposive sampling method, with the following criteria  ; 
1. Samples are companies included in the index of LQ45 in the Indonesian 
stock exchange annually from 2014 to 2018.  
2. Samples are companies included in the LQ45 index which publishes the full 
annual report containing financial statements and audit reports to the public. 
 
Research Object 
 Based on the sample selection criteria, obtained 33 companies included in 
the LQ45 index meet the criteria of purposive sampling, thus observing as many 
as 165 objects for the five-year range of research. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
1. Normality test 
0
5
10
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20
25
30
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 165
Observations 156
Mean      -1.49e-17
Median   0.000629
Maximum  0.208275
Minimum -0.218555
Std. Dev.   0.076410
Skewness  -0.087416
Kurtosis   3.219302
Jarque-Bera  0.511288
Probability  0.774418
 
Figure 1: Normality test results 
Based on the normal residual normality test obtained a probability value of 0511 
for variable residues. It can be concluded that all research variables are worth 
more. 
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2. Multicholinerity Test 
Table 1 : Multicholinerity test Results 
From table 2, the VIF value of each independent variable is less than 10. By doing 
so, each independent variable has not occurred the symptoms of multicolinearity 
and intervariable Independent has no correlation.  
3. Heteroskedastisitas Test 
1. Institutional ownership using a proxy comparison between the number 
of shares owned by the institution to the number of shares circulation 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥 100% 
 
2. Managerial ownership using a proxy comparison of the number of shares 
owned by the management of the shares in the amount circulating 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥 100% 
 
3. Board of Commissioners of Independe using comparative proxy 
The number of independent commissioners of the company with the 
𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 =  𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  x 100% 
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
  Table 2  descriptive statistical variable of research can be obtained an 
overview of the characteristics of data from research variables. The Data used has 
been a normal tridistic and has been through the test stages of classical 
assumptions including multicholinerity test, heteroskedastisity and autocorrelation.  
 
 
Table 2 : Descriptive statistical variables research 
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4. Autocorrelation test 
Table 3 : Autocorrelation test Results 
From the table 3 It can be known value Durbin-Watson stat table Durbin-
Watson All independent variables are located in the positive correlation area i.e. 
DU < DW < 4-DU. So it can be concluded that the entire variable in the research 
based on the data panel is not occurring autocorrelation.  
  In accordance with the 1st hypothesis, institutional ownership has no 
effect on profit management. Based on the results of testing T statistic gained 
institutional ownership has a value of T count 1.1198 with a probability of 
significance of 0.2645. It indicates that the value of T-statistic significance is greater 
than 0.05 (p > 0.05). The higher the level of shares ownership of other institutions 
in the company will make the level of fraud to manipulate the financial statements 
that are likely to be reduced, but the large shares owned by the managerial parties 
can not be used as a reference to reduce profit management, because of the large 
amount of institutional ownership but with the performance of poor institutional 
shareholders or not to carry out its function as an institutional share owner, the 
action of profit management or manipulation of financial statements may occur due 
to less supervision of the management Institutional. 
  In accordance with the 2nd hypothesis, managerial ownership has no 
effect on profit management. Based on the results of testing T statistic gained 
institutional ownership has a value of T-1.2319 with a probability of significance of 
0.2199. It indicates that the value of T-statistic significance is greater than 0.05 (p 
> 0.05). With the ownership of the manager will reduce the action of profit 
management, because managers will tend to be cautious in making financial 
 KI KM DKI UK DTA 
Mean 0.569 0.003 0.424 17.671 0.049 
Median 0.567 0.000 0.400 17.399 0.038 
Max 0.999 0.154 0.800 21.843 0.510 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.142 14.958 -0.204 
Std.dev 0.246 0.016 0.129 1.470 0.105 
      
Obser 165 165 165 165 165 
Cross 
Section 
33 33 33 33 33 
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statements as reasonably as possible in accordance with accounting standards 
rules or managers will reduce the action of profit management or manipulation of 
equity reports for the benefit of investors and also himself. 
  In accordance with the 3th hypothesis, Independedn Board of 
Commissioners has no effect on profit management. Based on the results of testing 
T statistic gained institutional ownership has a value of T count 1.4729 with a 
probability of significance of 0.1431. It indicates that the value of T-statistic 
significance is greater than 0.05 (p > 0.05). 
 The small large share ownership owned by the Independent party does not 
necessarily affect the managerial parties in drafting financial statements and does 
not necessarily reduce profit management, because of the large ownership of the 
independent Commissioner does not necessarily produce maximum performance 
preformance run its duties as a supervisory board and so vice versa the little 
ownership does not necessarily have poor performance of the Commissioner 
Independe, so the small ownership is not necessarily a reference of a company 
doing profit management because it depends on the performance of supervision 
and function Commissioner whether it is maximal in carrying out its duties or not. 
Therefore, in this research, the Board of Commissioners has no influence on profit 
management 
 
CONCLUSION 
  The variables used to detect profit management on financial reporting in 
the company were included in the LQ45 index at IDX in 2014-2018. It can be 
concluded that institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the independent 
Board of Commissioners and the size of the company as co-shared control 
variables simultaneously affect profit management and can explain profit 
management measures of 7.30% while the 92.70% is explained by the factors 
outside the study. 
  While the independent variable is institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, the independent Board of Commissioners partially does not affect profit 
management. Only control variables that affect profit. 
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